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Abstract
This chapter explores Rainer Forst’s justification-centric view of non-domination
toleration. This view places an idea of equal respect and a corresponding require-
ment of reciprocal and general justification at the core of non-domination toler-
ation. After reconstructing this view, this chapter addresses two issues. First, even
if this idea of equal respect requires the limits of non-domination toleration to be
drawn in a manner that is equally justifiable to all affected people, equal justifi-
ability should not be understood in terms of Forst’s requirement of reciprocal and
general acceptability. Second, for the equal justifiability of relevant constraints to
ensure non-domination outcomes, discursive equality must be understood in
substantive, purchase-sensitive terms. This means that a justification-centric
view of non-domination toleration stands or falls with the participation value of
T. M. Besch (*)
School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: thomas.besch@whu.edu.cn; thomas.besch@sydney.edu.au
J.-S. Lee (*)
School of Social Sciences, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: js.lee@unsw.edu.au
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
M. Sardoĉ (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03227-2_22-1
1
what it regards as the standards of justification. This places reasonably contested
matters of value at the heart of such views.
Keywords
Respect · Toleration · Justification · Non-domination · Discursive equality ·
Reasonableness · Discursive influence
Introduction
Can a practice of toleration impose constraints without instantiating domination?
This chapter explores Rainer Forst’s seminal justification-centric view of non-dom-
ination toleration (2003a, b; Forst 2017a). In a nutshell, this view finds a form of
equal respect and a corresponding requirement of reciprocal and general justification
at the core of non-domination toleration. For Forst, practices of toleration can
instantiate non-domination toleration only if they respect all affected people as
moral-political equals. To this end, he claims, these practices must only impose
constraints that are justifiable to all affected people by reasons that they can equally
accept – which aims to capture a “Kantian republican” sense of non-domination
(Forst 2013). On this basis, Forst insists that practices of toleration should draw the
limits of toleration in terms of the requirement of reciprocal and general justification.
While this view, or its underlying commitment to a demanding form of equal
respect, has merits, it gives rise to two concerns. First, even if non-domination
toleration is possible only where people are suitably respected as equals and this
calls for the equal justifiability of relevant constraints, there are reasons not to
construe the kind of justification that is called for here in terms of a Forst-type
reciprocal and general justification. Given the purposes of non-domination tolera-
tion, then, it is an open question what constitutes equal justifiability.
Second, that salient constraints are justifiable in practices of justification that
accord people a formally equal justificatory say does not secure non-domination
outcomes unless this say allows each person to exercise a suitable level of discursive
influence in justification, or on its outcomes – that is, unless this say has suitable
“discursive purchase” (Besch 2019a, p. 471f). This means that the kind of discursive
equality at the core of a justification-centric conception of non-domination toleration
must be understood in substantive, “purchase-sensitive” terms (Besch 2019a, p.
475f). This places important, yet reasonably contestable matters of value at the
heart of such a conception. And it asks us to focus on the “participation value”
(Besch 2019a, p. 468) of standards of justification, and to engage the question of
how the good of discursive influence can permissibly or justly be allocated across
diverse constituencies.
Below, these two issues are addressed against the background of a reconstruction
of Forst’s view. Section “Toleration: Concept and Conceptions” considers salient
aspects of the concept and some conceptions of toleration. As the focus of this
chapter is on respect toleration, section “Respect, Respect Toleration, and
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Justification” elaborates on respect, respect toleration, and the idea of justification
that Forst intertwines with these things. Section “Power and Non-domination”
attends to the notions of power and non-domination. To complete the reconstructive
part of the discussion, section “True Toleration and Non-domination?” puts these
things together and specifies the contours of Forst’s view of non-domination toler-
ation. Section “Reasonableness?” then engages the idea of the reasonable that does
important work in Forst’s view of reciprocal and general justification. Once the
question arises what “reasonable”means in this context, shortcomings of the view at
hand emerge. Section “Discursive Equality?” addresses the idea of discursive
equality that underpins Forst’s thinking about justification and non-domination
toleration. It emerges that discursive equality is compatible with problematic forms
of domination unless discursive equality is understood in suitably substantive,
purchase-sensitive terms. This points toward matters of value that bear on how
standards of acceptability-based justification are defined, or their participation
value is calibrated–matters that are more fundamental than justifications by these
standards. Section “Summary and Future Directions” concludes.
Toleration: Concept and Conceptions
To provide some needed background, this section addresses the concept and con-
ceptions of toleration; it will do so following Forst’s account (Forst 2003a, b). The
section begins with a note on a salient supposition of toleration.
While all toleration involves noninterference with an object of toleration, or what
is being tolerated, social toleration – that is, interpersonal or intergroup relationships
of toleration – supposes in tolerators some power to interfere with toleratees and
assumes in toleratees a corresponding vulnerability. Betty’s noninterference with
Paul’s drinking instantiates toleration only if she can interfere with it and hence only
if Paul is vulnerable to that interference. Toleration thus supposes patterns of power.
These need not be asymmetrical: for example, where toleration is mutual, it may not
be. And the vehicles through which toleration is enacted need not take the form of
individual acts or omissions. Vehicles of toleration can vary widely – for example,
they can involve collective actions or omissions, policies and practices, norms and
institutions, legislation, incentive schemes, “justification narratives” (Forst 2017a,
pp. 55–74), and so forth.
Given such patterns of power, all toleration involves an “objection” component
and an “acceptance” component (Forst 2017a, p. 78; 2003a, b; King 1998;
McKinnon 2006). The tolerator must take it not only that there is something about
the object of toleration that is objectionable or rejectable, but also that there is
something about that object that is acceptable, merits approval, or is respectable.
That toleration requires objection and acceptance has led some theorists to question
whether toleration is coherent, viable, or desirable (Fletcher 1996; Mendus 1988;
Newey 2013; Scanlon 2003; Williams 1996). In this chapter, it is assumed that
toleration can be coherent and desirable.
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Next, in toleration the acceptance component “trumps” the objection component:
there must be “positive reasons which trump the negative ones in the relevant
context,” so that the object of toleration is “considered to be wrong, but not
intolerably wrong” (Forst 2003b, p. 72). For example, Betty might disapprove of
the health effects of Paul’s drinking, but since she also sees it as an expression of his
autonomy that she has overriding reasons to respect, she does not interfere with it.
The tolerator’s acceptance reasons, however, may or may not be reasons that the
toleratee can accept as such acceptance reasons.
Not least, all toleration is normatively bounded – a matter that will be relevant
later. As Forst highlights, a practice of toleration involves two boundaries, or
normative lines. One line separates things that are accepted from things that are
rejected but tolerated: this line indicates where acceptance ends and toleration begins
(Forst 2003b, p. 72). Another line separates these things from things that are rejected
as intolerable: this line marks the outer boundary of toleration, and it is often referred
to as the limit of toleration. Forst also refers to this latter line as the “rejection”
component in toleration (Forst 2017a, p. 78).
It is not always apparent where practices of toleration actually draw these lines, or
on what grounds they do so. And, normatively, it is often contested where these lines
should be drawn and on what grounds this may be done. Particularly relevant here is
the line that marks the outer boundary, or the limit of toleration. That toleration has
limits is sometimes taken to call into question whether any practice of toleration can
truly be tolerant – rather than merely imposing on people some conception of what is
intolerable that is dogmatic, arbitrary, parochial, or oppressive. The idea that there
cannot be true toleration is sometimes referred to as a “paradox” of toleration – a
problem that raises deep challenges for a normative view of toleration (Besch 2010;
Forst 2003a, b; Newey 2013; Rossi 2013). This issue will be revisited later.
Next, at least four conceptions of toleration can be distinguished: permission,
coexistence, respect, and esteem toleration. As only respect toleration matters here,
the other three are only briefly mentioned. In permission toleration, tolerators grant
toleration, or relevant permissions, from a position of (assumed or actual) superiority
in order to advance their own ends. For example, “an authority permits one or several
minorities to live in accordance with their beliefs . . . provided that they do not
challenge the supremacy of this authority” (Forst 2017a, p. 78). Coexistence toler-
ation is symmetrical and instrumental: the parties instrumentally tolerate one another
as a modus vivendi (Forst 2003b, p. 74). For example, two hostile religious groups
agree to no longer interfere with one another in order to avert their own destruction.
Esteem toleration is symmetrical, too, but it expresses a form of “mutual recogni-
tion,” albeit one that reflects a “fuller, more demanding” form of recognition than the
one expressed in respect-toleration (see below) (Forst 2003b, p. 75). Esteem toler-
ation is based on “ethical esteem” of tolerated beliefs as “ethically attractive and held
for good reasons,” although this esteem is “reserved,” insofar as tolerators regard
these beliefs as less attractive than their own (ibid). For example, Muslim Betty and
Christian Paul positively value each other’s religions as forms of monotheism,
although each believes their own faith to be closer to the truth.
What matters here is what Forst calls the respect conception of toleration. Respect
toleration is symmetrical and moral, rather than instrumental: it expresses a form of
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moral respect (Darwall 1977). In respect toleration, the parties may “hold incom-
patible ethical beliefs about the good and right way of life,” but they “respect each
other as moral-political equals in the sense that their common framework of social
life should . . . be guided by norms that all parties can equally accept” (Forst 2003b,
p. 74). Elsewhere, Forst adds:
Although [the parties] differ sharply in their respective notions of the good and of salvation,
they accord each other a status as equals which states that generally valid norms must rest on
reasons that all those affected can accept equally and do not favour one side . . . The
“authority” to “bestow” liberties. . . resides . . . in a process of general legitimation that
provides for a special level of justification in questions of principle. (Forst 2017a, p. 79)
This ties respect toleration to equal acceptability justification. When Betty respect-
tolerates Paul, she respects him as a moral-political equal, or as an equal authority of
justice and justification – and hence as someone who has, or should be accorded, a
discursive status such that moral or political things (such as norms, institutions, and
social structure) that affect Paul must be justifiable to Paul on the basis of reasons
that are equally acceptable by him. Hence, to respect-tolerate people in this sense
commits to the view that where they are relevantly affected, they are owed justifi-
cations by reasons that are equally acceptable by them.
Not least, the above depicts respect toleration as interagentive in the narrow sense
of a relationship between individual agents, but respect toleration can also be an
intergroup phenomenon, or a group-level response of one social group to another
such group (Galeotti 2002). In this chapter, it is assumed that toleration is
interagentive in a wide sense: it can instantiate as a relationship between individual
or collective agents.
Respect, Respect Toleration, and Justification
This brings us to the idea of equal respect that Forst-type respect toleration impli-
cates. The idea of robust discursive equality that this kind of toleration entails will be
discussed later, given the idea of equal respect that it builds on. It hence is useful to
now elaborate on this idea and to register, as well, that respect toleration can be
premised on different ideas of respect.
To start with, Forst’s rendering of respect toleration is not doctrinally innocuous.
It conceptualizes respect toleration in a manner that ties it to a particular view of
respect and a particular kind of justification. And of course it is contested what kind
of reason giving, if any, proper respect for other people calls for (Carter and Ferretti
2013; Rossi 2013; Besch 2010, 2018, 2019b). Even assuming that proper respect for
other people is a kind of recognition respect that responds to morally important
features of them – to mention just a few prominent candidates, these features might
be their capacity for agency, autonomy, personhood, or their being free and equal,
reasonable people, and so on (Darwall 1977; Raz 1986; Macedo 1991; Postema
1995; Kymlicka 1996; Rawls 2005; Larmore 2015) – it is open how we should
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respond to these features. This point can be elaborated by contrasting two ideas of
equal respect that would yield different views of respect toleration.
First, consider the familiar view that equal respect requires treating others as
equal recipients of justice. On such a view, conduct or social structure that affects
people can respect them properly only insofar as it is just in a substantive sense – that
is, it must accord with the content of justice, or the rights, liberties, or opportunities
that just social structure allocates to people. Equal respect in this sense is a concep-
tion-dependent constraint the content of which is given by, or is defined in terms of, a
(putatively) authoritative, reasonable, or justifiable conception of justice. Conse-
quently, respect toleration in this sense commits to noninterference with other people
– or their conceptions of what is good, right or true, their choices, practices, or forms
of life, and so forth – only insofar as the content of justice calls for it, as defined
accordingly.
One upshot: prior to knowing what justice calls for, substantively speaking, equal
respect in the conception-dependent sense leaves open whether actions, practices, or
institutions that relevantly affect people must be justifiable to them on the basis of
reasons that they can equally accept – rather than, for example, reasons that they
could or would accept at some high level of idealization (e.g., when fully rational or
perfectly responsible epistemically), or reasons that actually apply to them whether
or not they realize that this is so (Wall 2016; Steinhoff 2015; Besch 2010, 2019a, b).
A different view of equal respect typically is in play in “recognitive” conceptions
of acceptability-based public justification (Besch 2019b, p. 613; see also section
“Discursive Equality?”, below). On such views, equal respect is not simply some-
thing the content of which is defined by a putatively authoritative conception of
justice. Rather, it is (primarily) a constraint on the justifications that people are owed
in relevant moral or political matters, including justifications of the standards and
values of justice that (putatively) just social structure applies to them. The idea here
is that a justification of moral or political things must accord each relevant person a
meaningful level of discursive influence in justification, or on its outcomes, so as to
respect each person not simply as a recipient, but as an equal co-author or equal
authority of justification (Forst 2017a, p. 134; 2017b, p. 545). Where equal respect is
construed in such justification-constraining terms, it is often conjoined with three
other views (for relevant things, such as conduct, practices, or social structure, φ):
(i) φ, to equally respect relevant people, needs to accord with principles or values
that are justifiable to them by reasons that are equally acceptable by them (the
equal acceptability requirement),
(ii) While people must have a meaningful say in justification, they must have some
measure of influence on what can or cannot count as justifiable to, or equally
acceptable by, them (the discursive influence requirement).
Not least, (i) and (ii) often come intertwined with a constructivism requirement
according to which relevant moral or political things depend for some relevant moral
or political merit on their equal acceptability:
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(iii) The principles or values referred to in (i) are valid (or right, or reasonable) only
if they are justifiable to all relevant people by reasons that are equally accept-
able by them (the constructivism requirement).
These views mark different elements of the idea that others should be respected as
equal authorities of justification in the justification-constraining sense. Equal respect,
when it is construed along such lines, takes the form of discursive respect and
requires that people be accorded a form of robust discursive equality (Besch 2014,
2019a; this is discussed further below).
What does this entail at the site of toleration? When premised on justification-
constraining respect, respect toleration calls for noninterference if and when inter-
ference – or principles, values, or policies, and so on, that would call for interference
– cannot be justified to all affected people by reasons that, in a suitably meaningful
sense, are equally acceptable by them. Plainly, this can point us in different direc-
tions than a practice of respect-toleration that builds on respect in the conception-
dependent sense. What conception-dependent respect-toleration calls for cannot be
identified independently from the contents of a conception of justice. But what a
putatively authoritative conception of justice prescribes might not also be justifiable
by reasons that, in some suitably meaningful sense, each of the relevantly affected
can equally accept.
Forst construes equal respect primarily in a justification-constraining sense. As he
puts it in a passage quoted earlier, in exercising respect toleration, people “respect
each other as moral-political equals in the sense that their common framework of
social life should . . . be guided by norms that all parties can equally accept”
(emphasis added). This refers to Forst’s requirement of reciprocal and general
acceptability (or RGA, for short), understood as a requirement of justification.
According to RGA, moral or political normative claims, to be justified, or valid,
must be equally acceptable, or non-rejectable, by all affected people; at stages Forst
takes this to require that justifications be based on reasons that no-one can reasonably
reject (Forst 2017a, p. 28f; 2012, p. 21; 2010; 2013; Besch 2010; see also section
“Reasonableness?”, below). However, to respect people as moral-political equals, or
as equal authorities of justification, is to respect them as people to whom justifica-
tions are owed in matters that affect them that meet RGA – and this means to respect
them as equal authorities of justification (Forst 2017a, pp. 134, 6ff).
This ties equal respect to variant of the equal acceptability requirement and the
constructivism requirement (see above). It also ties it to a variant of the discursive
influence requirement. Forst assumes that where reason giving meets RGA, it
accords affected people a qualified veto-right that (putatively) protects or helps to
protect them from domination (Forst 2001, p. 168f; 2010, p. 719). Evidently, the
assumption here is that people can use these veto rights to bring to bear their voice on
what can or cannot count as justifiable to them. It is on the basis of this assumption
that Forst attributes to reciprocal and general justifications an emancipatory or
protective function and finds them at the normative core of a “basic structure of
justification” that enables true non-domination (Forst 2017a, pp. 6f, 131–137; 2013,
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p. 155). Hence, justifications that meet RGA (putatively) accord people a measure of
discursive influence in justification.
What matters for this chapter is only respect toleration in the second, justification-
constraining sense. While the focus is on Forst’s view here, the issues to be explored
later are not specific for his approach. Forst, of course, is not the only theorist who
construes respect toleration in justification-constraining terms. Seminal on the point
is Rawls-type political liberalism – which strongly influences Forst. As Rawls
observes, “political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself”
(Rawls 2005, p. 10). The label “toleration” here refers to a respect-based commit-
ment to avoid reasonable disagreement in public justification – or a principle of
justificatory neutrality (Larmore 2015, pp. 68–74). For Rawls and other political
liberals, political power can properly respect reasonable citizens as free and equal,
and hence be legitimate, only if it is publicly justifiable to them on grounds they can
equally accept (Besch 2012). Yet values, conceptions, or doctrines fail to be so
acceptable when reasonable citizens reasonably disagree about them. Thus, no
conception of justice can provide a basis for a publicly justifiable, legitimate exercise
of political power unless it avoids reasonable disagreement – a conclusion that
motivates the project of a political liberalism. In short, political liberalism adopts a
justification-constraining idea of equal respect – that is, a demanding form of
discursive respect (Besch 2018) – and shapes in this light its view of public
justification.
Power and Non-domination
Next, the relationship between toleration and power is discussed, starting with
remarks on power.
As Allen (2015) observes, power can be present as power-over or domination,
power-to or agentive resource, or power-with or a form of collaborative agentive
empowerment. What matters here is only power-over. In clear-cut cases, power in
this form is or entails a relationship of influence between individual or collective
agents such that one agent α (in the role of power agent) imposes constraints on
another agent β (in the role of power subject). This relationship may or may not be
symmetrical (e.g., α and β might each occupy the role of power agent and power
subject vis-à-vis each other), it may or may not be voluntary, and it may or may not
be morally or otherwise objectionable. In less than clear-cut cases, an interagentive
schema does not or not clearly apply. For example, in the case of “systemic”
domination, a “system of social relations” rather than any particular individual or
collective agent, subjects all agents to its “functional imperatives” (Azmanova 2018,
p. 69). Other cases involve interagentive power, but power agents merely administer
power rather than also sourcing it. For example, where government officials use the
powers attached to their offices to impose constraints on people, they may act as
power agents, but they do not source the power they administer – that source resides
in the institutions that appoints them to their offices and that attaches to these offices
the relevant powers.
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The focus of this chapter is on a particular kind of power-over, namely, domina-
tion. When α dominates β (in the sense relevant here), α exercises power over β. If
domination entails power-over, what distinguishes it from other kinds of power-
over? This chapter considers a republican answer to this question. Roughly, repub-
lican views tend to conceptualize the phenomenon of domination by considering in
what way (if any) agents can bring to bear their perspective or will on the constraints
that apply to them. Specifically, they take domination to occur where agents cannot
relevantly influence what constraints apply to them.
For instance, on Pettit’s (2012) control-centric account, a government dominates
citizens when they cannot make use of relevant political or social tools, such as
political participation rights or opportunities for political speech, to exercise a
relevant level of control over the political or legal constraints that the government
applies to them. More relevant now, however, is Forst’s justification-centric, “Kant-
ian republican” view (Forst 2013). On this view, political power instantiates dom-
ination when it imposes constraints on people that are not justifiable to them
“reciprocally and generally,” or on grounds that all affected people can equally
accept (e.g., ibid., pp. 157, 159f). How so?
Forst adopts a justification-centric version of an “arbitrary power” conception of
domination (Lovett 2010, Chapter 4). For Forst, domination occurs when people are
subjected to arbitrary constraints, while he construes constraints as arbitrary if and
when they lack “adequate justification” (Forst 2013, p. 155) or “legitimate reason”
(ibid., 157). And in moral or political contexts, non-arbitrariness calls for justifica-
tions on the basis of reasons that are equally acceptable by all affected people. The
upshot: if β is subjected to constraints, φ, this does not instantiate domination so long
as φ is justifiable by reasons that β can equally accept. Consequently: if we do not
know or have reasons to doubt whether φ is so justifiable, then we do not know or
have reasons to doubt whether β’s subjection to φ instantiates non-domination
power-over.
In essence, this conjoins two familiar views: it grafts a view of non-domination as
justifiable subjection onto an idea of equal (discursive) respect as calling for justi-
fications on grounds that relevant people can equally accept. On this view, the good
of equal (discursive) respect is the key good that stands to be secured where power
over others is exercised; accordingly, justifiable subjection is conceptualized in terms
that reflect a view of what it takes to properly secure that good. And so the idea
becomes that non-domination power-over must impose suitably justifiable con-
straints, where this is interpreted as calling for equal acceptability justifications.
Before moving on, two things need to be highlighted. First, the view of non-
domination in play here has a political ring, but it applies not only to political power
in the narrow sense of state power. Forst’s focus is on (non-)arbitrary constrains in a
wide sense. He understands “arbitrariness”
in a social sense, whether it assumes the form of arbitrary rule by individuals or by part of the
community (for example, a class) over others, or of the acceptance of social contingencies
that lead to asymmetrical positions or relations of domination and are defended and accepted
as an unalterable fate, even though they are nothing of the sort. Arbitrary rule is the rule of
some people over others without legitimate reason, that is, domination, and where struggles
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are conducted against injustice they are first and foremost directed against forms of domi-
nation of this kind. (Forst 2013, p. 157)
Arbitrary constraints need not be political to constitute domination. Thus, in the
domain of the political and elsewhere, non-domination power-over requires con-
straints that people are subjected to be justifiable to them on equally acceptable
grounds – only in this case can the imposition on them of these constraints suitably
respect them as moral-political equals.
Second, also a justification-centric view of (non-)domination must place impor-
tance on something in the way of control over the constraints that apply to agents.
The justifiability of relevant constraints can plausibly distinguish domination power-
over from non-domination power-over only insofar as justification is understood in
terms that allocate power subjects a relevant measure of influence on what con-
straints apply, or may apply, to them. Thus, much here depends on the level of
discursive influence that agents can exercise in justification. And this puts center
stage what we called earlier the discursive influence requirement. Forst is not
unaware of this. If the constraints that α imposes on β are not equally acceptable
by β, Forst, it seems, would insist that α should see this as a reason not to impose
these constraints on β. After all, he takes it that people should be respected as moral-
political equals, and he often puts this point also by saying that this involves
according them a (qualified) veto right in matters that affect them (Forst 2001, p.
168f; 2010, p. 719).
The point: a justification-centric view must give importance to control or influ-
ence over constraints, although it might foreground reason giving – or “institution-
alized justification procedures” (Forst 2013, p. 159) – as a method through which
control or influence is exercised.
True Toleration and Non-domination?
This section addresses the theme of non-domination toleration. It has often been
argued that toleration can involve domination (Galeotti 2002; Forst 2003a, b;
Honohan 2013). Practices of toleration distinguish between things that are counted
as tolerable and things that are seen as intolerable, (strictly) impermissible, or as
proper objects of reproach, punishment, prosecution, or other negative social sanc-
tions. And when views of the limits of toleration are legally, politically, or otherwise
imposed on agents, they take the form of constraints on them, or their agency. Thus:
at least when practices of toleration impose their views of these limits in the form of
such constraints, they involve power-over. If this is so, what does it take for such
practices to instantiate non-domination toleration?
To start with, when do questions of toleration arise? According to Forst,
the context in which the question of toleration between citizens arises is a context of justice:
what is at issue here is the just – that is, mutually justifiable – legal and political structure for
a pluralistic community of citizens with different ethical beliefs. Claims for toleration are
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raised as claims for justice, and intolerance is a form of injustice, favouring one ethical
community over others without legitimate grounds. (Forst 2003b, p. 76)
This understands “the question of toleration” in terms of the question of when
exercises of political power – specifically, legal or political constraints – are just or
justifiable. For Forst, then, toleration and political non-domination are different sides
of the same coin. Either way, the key normative issue is whether salient constraints
properly respect people as moral-political equals. And either way, constraints can do
so only if they are justifiable by reasons that are equally acceptable by relevant
people.
To elaborate, consider first real or true toleration – as opposed to practices of
toleration that distinguish between the tolerable and the intolerable in terms that are
intolerant. This relates to one of the “paradoxes” of toleration, that is, the “paradox of
drawing the limits” (Forst 2003a, p. 38ff; 2003b, p. 70ff). Says Forst:
All toleration necessarily implies intolerance toward those who are seen as intolerable . . .
The concept of tolerance makes no sense without certain limits, though as soon as these are
substantively defined, tolerance seems to turn into nothing but intolerance. There is thus no
“true” tolerance. To resolve this paradox a conception of toleration must show how far its
limits can be drawn in a mutually justifiable and non-arbitrary way. (Forst 2003b, p. 72)
However, the paradox can be overcome if the limits of toleration are drawn in terms
that suitably respect all affected people as moral-political equals, and that cannot be
rejected reasonably. To this end, this line must be drawn on the basis of RGA itself,
the requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (Forst 2003b, pp. 76–78).
(This notion of “drawing” or “defining” the limits of toleration refers not merely to
the intellectual activity of defining those limits, but also to the social, legal or
political imposition or enforcement of views of these limits.)
Two main lines of thought are in play here. First, of course, Forst puts to work the
idea that people should be respected as moral-political equals – or as equal author-
ities of justice or justification, or, as he also says, as agents who are equally “worthy
of being given adequate, justifying reasons in matters that affect them,” or who have
an equal “right to justification” (Forst 2003a, pp. 76f, 81). As such, agents are owed
reciprocal and general justifications in matters that affect them. Thus, social structure
that imposes on them a view of the limits of toleration must be justifiable to them on
grounds that they can equally accept, while respect toleration – where “respect” is
understood as discursive respect, in a justification-constraining sense – is a “supe-
rior” kind of toleration (Forst 2003a, p. 76).
Second, since the limits of toleration must be drawn in terms that do not depend
for their justification on grounds that can reasonably be rejected, they should be
drawn on the basis of RGA itself. That is, to draw these limits in a way that suitably
respects people, they must be drawn in terms that are justifiable on grounds that are
equally acceptable by all affected people. For Forst, this calls for a justification on
grounds that no affected person can reject reasonably. And here, he looks to RGA:
for Forst, RGA cannot be rejected reasonably. Thus, he offers RGA as a standard by
which to draw the limits of toleration. Accordingly,
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[c]itizens are tolerant if they accept the boundary set by the criteria of reciprocity and
generality as both delineating the justifiability of mutually binding norms and the limits of
toleration. Tolerant citizens are ‘reasonable’ in accepting that (. . .) an ethical objection does
not amount to a legitimate moral rejection; and they also see that they have a moral duty to
tolerate all those ethical beliefs and practices that they disagree with but that do not violate
the threshold of reciprocity and generality (trying to force their views on others). Such a
violation of the basic right to justification is a form of intolerance that cannot be tolerated.
(Forst 2003b, p. 78; Forst’s emphasis)
Persons are tolerant to the extent that . . . they tolerate all other views within the bounds of
reciprocity and generality. (Ibid., p.78)
Being tolerant . . .means seeking reasonable justification, accepting reasonable disagreement
within the limits of reciprocity and generality, and being aware of the different contexts of
justification that persons are part of. (Ibid., p. 81)
This suggests the following view (for a candidate object of toleration, φ):
1. Practices of toleration must respect all affected agents as moral-political equals, or
as equal authorities of justification.
2. To this end, the (legal, political) limits of toleration must be drawn in terms that
are reciprocally and generally justifiable.
3. Thus, the (legal, political) limits of toleration must be drawn in terms that do not
depend for their justification on grounds that can reasonably be rejected.
4. Practices of toleration should (legally, politically) limit toleration on the basis of
RGA itself.
5. Hence: if (legally, politically) interfering with φ would not be reciprocally and
generally justifiable, φ is tolerable; but if (legally, politically) interfering with φ is
so justifiable, then φ is intolerable.
This appears to be the core of Forst’s normative conception of non-domination
toleration. Claims (2) to (5) draw out what practices of toleration must be like to
properly instantiate (1), while the notion of “reciprocal and general justification” in
(2) refers to justifications on the basis of reasons that are equally acceptable by all
affected people.
Forst believes that his view overcomes the “paradox of drawing the limits.”When
the line between the tolerable and the intolerable is drawn in terms of RGA, it is
drawn in a manner that extends equal respect to all affected people:
By drawing the ‘limits of toleration’with the help of the criteria of reciprocity and generality,
we draw them . . . in the widest possible way given the existence of a large diversity of
world-views, without sacrificing one for the sake of the unjustifiable claims of another. Thus
there is not arbitrary substantive content that defines the tolerable; this content is open to
dispute and argument, and protection is given to those voices in danger of being marginal-
ized. Those who violate the basic norm of mutual respect implied by that cannot claim to be
the victims of intolerance. (Ibid., p. 82)
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Hence, if the limits of toleration are drawn in suitably justifiable terms, practices of
toleration do not dominate: the constraints that they impose will respect each
affected person as moral-political equals.
Reasonableness?
This conception of non-domination toleration has limits. The role that it accords to
an idea of equal (discursive) respect has much moral appeal. But there are reasons to
doubt the coherence of this conception. To explain why, this section begins with
comments on the idea of the reasonable at work in Forst’s conception of non-
domination toleration. After that, section “Discursive Equality?” will address the
idea of equal respect on which this conception builds, or the kind of discursive
equality it entails.
Recall: Forst claims that practices of toleration must respect people as moral-
political equals, but can do so only if the standards by which these practices draw the
limits of toleration – that is, the standards that serve as their criterion of toleration –
cannot reasonably be rejected. On this basis, Forst offers RGA as a criterion of
toleration. But is RGA reasonably non-rejectable? Consider the content Forst builds
into his idea of reasonableness:
The epistemological element of being reasonable consists in an insight into the finitude of
both theoretical and practical reason in finding ‘final’ answers to the question of the good
that all can agree on . . . [and] in an insight into the possibilities of reason, that is, the capacity
of reaching mutually justifiable normative answers. [This commits to] the task of finding and
defending justifiable reasons, because this is what reasonable and finite persons . . . owe to
each other. (. . .) [T]he normative element of being reasonable implies this form of respect for
others as reasonable and worthy of being given adequate reasons; that is respect for their
basic right to justification. Both elements in combination (. . .) are the basis for the accep-
tance and the recognition of the threshold of reciprocity and generality. They provide the
essential reasons for being tolerant. Being tolerant thus means seeking reasonable agreement
within the limits of reciprocity and generality, and being aware of the different contexts of
justification that persons are part of. (Forst 2003b, p. 80f)
This effectively defines into reasonableness (i) a commitment to respect people as
moral-political equals in Forst’s justification-constraining sense, and (ii) a commit-
ment to the view that people are owed reciprocal and general justifications in moral
or political matters that affect them, that is, justifications that meet RGA. Although
reasonableness so construed is philosophically interesting and these commitments
are, to some extent, morally attractive, various concerns arise.
First, these commitments can be rejected reasonably – unless we first define
reasonableness in philosophically partisan terms. As Moore (1996) observes, as far
as the meaning of the word “reasonable” in ordinary discourse is concerned,
“reasonable” people are committed to reason-giving, or justification, and they take
it that other people are worthy of reason-giving and moral consideration. But a
commitment to reason-giving, or justification, is not a commitment to Forst-type
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reciprocal and general justification. And a commitment to the view that people merit
moral consideration is not a commitment to accord them equal respect, or to respect
them as moral-political equals in a justification-constraining sense. The point: people
can be “reasonable” in an ordinary discourse sense of the word even if they deny,
doubt, or do not act in accordance with, the view that people should be respected as a
moral-political equal in a justification-constraining sense, or the view that other
people are owed reciprocal and general justifications, or the view that the goodness
of good, justifying reasons depends on their equal acceptability by all affected
people, and so forth.
Second, Forst has reasons not to define the commitments referred to in (i) and (ii),
above, into his idea of reasonableness. On the one hand, this must render the claim
that RGA is reasonably non-rejectable trivial, if not viciously circular. It is unsur-
prising that reasonable people in Forst’s sense – say, reasonable-F people – cannot
coherently reject RGA. After all, reasonableness-F is construed as involving a
commitment to reciprocal and general justification. Hence, the claim that RGA, or
adopting RGA as a criterion of toleration, is reasonably-F non-rejectable (or equally
acceptable, or non-rejectable, by reasonable-F people) cannot carry justificatory
weight: the circle is too narrow.
On the other hand, other things being equal Forst cannot index a criterion of
toleration to the perspective of reasonable-F people without undermining his own,
inclusive intentions. On his view, a practice of non-domination toleration must
respect all affected people as moral-political equals, while this calls for justifications
on the basis of reasons that all affected people can equally accept. What matters for
non-domination toleration hence cannot merely be a criterion of toleration that is
equally acceptable only by reasonable-F people: this would be objectionably exclu-
sionary also by Forst’s own lights.
A third issue relates to two potentially competing requirements at work in Forst
view. Recall: on this view, a practice of non-domination toleration must respect
people as moral-political equals. To this end, he claims, it must draw the limits of
toleration in terms that are justifiable to all affected people by reasons they can
equally accept. But he insists that these limits must be drawn in reasonably non-
rejectable terms (i.e., reasonably-F non-rejectable terms). Thus, he claims:
(i) A criterion of toleration must be justifiable by reasons that are equally accept-
able by all affected people.
(ii) A criterion of toleration must be reasonably non-rejectable.
However, what is the relationship between (i) and (ii)? (i) and (ii) can point in
different directions: that φ cannot be rejected “reasonably” (on some definition of the
term or other) does not mean that φ is justifiable by reasons all affected people can
equally accept – and vice versa. And if (i) and (ii) can point in different directions,
what condition must a practice of toleration meet to suitably respect people as moral-
political equals?
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Things are complicated further by the obscurity of what (putative) reasons must
be like to count toward justification. According to RGA, reasons can justify salient
claims only if they are reciprocally and generally acceptable, or non-rejectable. This
has so far been interpreted in terms of the requirement that suitably justifying reasons
must be equally acceptable (reciprocity) by all affected people (generality). But this
simplifies. Forst sometimes suggests that a (candidate) reason to φ is a reciprocally
and generally acceptable (or non-rejectable) reason to φ only if no relevant person
can “reasonably” reject φ’s (alleged) status as such a reason – that is, only if φ’s
(alleged) role as such a reason is reasonably non-rejectable (Forst 2012, p. 21).
Roughly, this understand (i), above, in terms of (ii): if we want to know whether a
candidate criterion of toleration is justifiable by reasons that are equally acceptable
by all affected people, then we need to consider whether it is reasonably non-
rejectable.
Premising reciprocity and generality on some reasonableness constraint addresses
an important need. All conceptions or practices of acceptability-based justification
must somehow qualify the kind of acceptability or non-rejectability that they regard
as contributing to justification: for equal acceptability to justify, it must also be
respectable, or authoritative–for example, it must be rational, coherent, epistemi-
cally responsible, or, as it were, reasonable. Acceptability-based justification hence
is normatively indexed to the authoritativeness constraints that it (openly or tacitly)
adopts. However, such constraints often are in their own right contested. This is so
especially where these constraints are nontrivial – that is, where they impose
requirements that not all relevant people always meet anyway. Thus, premising
reciprocity and generality on an idea of reasonableness inevitably raises deeper
questions of justification: much here hinges on the content of the idea of reason-
ableness that comes in here and whatever reasons there are to premise reciprocity
and generality on it.
It emerged earlier that Forst’s notion of the reasonable is potentially problematic,
given its content. Forst’s explicit comments on the meaning of the notion of
reasonable non-rejectability appear to compound matters. He stresses that while he
takes the phrase “reasonably non-rejectable” from Scanlon, he “interpret[s]” it in
terms of his criteria of reciprocity and generality in order to “more precisely define
the meaning of “reasonable” than Scanlon did” (Forst 2012, p. 272; emphasis
added). This is in play when Forst more recently writes:
Adapting Thomas Scanlon’s formulation (“not reasonable to reject”), I believe that moral
justification requires that norms must rest on reasons that are not reciprocally and generally
rejectable. (Forst 2017a, p. 28f)
But then Forst seems to hold that a reason, φ, is a “reciprocally and generally”
acceptable (or non-rejectable) reason only if φ, or its role as a reason, is “reasonably”
non-rejectable, while φ, or its role as a reason, can qualify as “reasonably” non-
rejectable only if it is “reciprocally and generally acceptable” (or non-rejectable). As
this seems to be circular, it raises the question how anything could non-arbitrarily,
without mere stipulation, be claimed to be reciprocally and generally justifiable (see
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also Besch 2020). This threatens to collapse the view of justification onto which
Forst grafts his view of non-domination toleration.
The point: even if practices of toleration instantiate non-domination toleration
only if they extend equal (discursive) respect to all affected people, and even if such
practices must only impose constraints that are equally justifiable to each affected
person, there are reasons not to understand the kind of justification called for here in
terms of a Forst-type conception of reciprocal and general justifiability. It remains
open what constitutes the kind of equal justifiability that is needed for the purposes
of non-domination toleration.
Discursive Equality?
This section focuses on the idea of discursive equality that underpins Forst’s
conception of non-domination toleration. As discussed earlier, this conception places
a demanding form of equal respect at the heart of non-domination toleration. For
Forst, practices of toleration must respect people as moral-political equals, or as
equal authorities of justification, but can do so only if the constraints that they
impose on people are justifiable to them by reasons that they can equally accept.
Thus, on this conception, each affected person has or should have an equal justifi-
catory say in relation to such constraints – a say, moreover, that allows people to
exercise some relevant level of discursive influence on what constraints apply or
may apply to them. In other words, equal respect here requires that relevant people
be accorded a robust form of discursive equality (Besch 2019a).
The idea of discursive equality marks a familiar theme. Variants of the idea are
typically in play in recognitive conceptions of moral or political justification (Besch
2019b, p. 613). On such views, justification practice must suitably cohere with or
express proper respect for or recognition of actual people. Specifically, such views
take it that justification can properly respect people as equals only where it accords
them a meaningful equal justificatory say. Thus, such views tend to construe the
standards of justification in terms that idealize less, rather than more, so as to ensure
that people can exercise their say in justification in a manner that relevantly tracks
their actual voice and perspective (Besch 2019b, pp. 608–614). Accordingly, such
views foreground the participation value (Besch 2019a, p. 468) of justification as a
key dimension in which to calibrate the normativity of the standards of justification.
Salient examples include the views of public justification advanced by political
liberals like Rawls (2005), Macedo (1991), Larmore (2015), or Forst’s conception
of reciprocal and general justification.
Despite its prominence and moral appeal, the idea of discursive equality is not
without problems. One feature of this elusive idea is particularly relevant here:
discursive equality is compatible with forms of domination unless it is construed
in suitably substantive terms. But it is not obvious what these terms should be, while
any substantive view of discursive equality is likely to attract reasonable disagree-
ment. This further complicates the idea of a justification-centric, republican form of
non-domination toleration.
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Consider first the difference between formal and substantive discursive equality
(Besch 2019a, p. 473f). Recall that all acceptability-based justification must qualify
the kind of acceptability that it regards as justifying: for equal acceptability to justify,
it must also be authoritative. Now, the authoritativeness constraints that justification
practice adopts can accord people more or less discursive influence in justification,
given their actual voice or perspective, or their actual deliberative resources (as
opposed to the voice or perspective or deliberative resources that they would bring to
bear in justification if they perfectly satisfied the relevant authoritativeness con-
straints) (Besch 2019a, p. 4271f; Besch 2019b, pp. 606–611). For example, if
rejections must be ideally rational or fully reasonable (on some definition of what
this takes or other) in order to negatively contribute to φ’s justification status, actual
people can have very little discursive influence in justification. What Paul is actually
committed to reject or cannot actually accept coherently can be very different from
what he could or would reject if he was ideally rational or fully reasonable. And if
this difference is large enough, then Paul’s actual voice and perspective can be
deprived of any real discursive influence in justification or on its outcomes.
One upshot is this: a justificatory say – more generally, discursive standing – can
be (or fail to be) equal in more than one respect. It can be (or fail to be) equal in a
formal sense as a matter of the consistent application of relevant standards and
constraints to people, and in a substantive sense as a matter of the discursive
influence that an application of these things to people allows them to exercise in
justification, or on its outcomes. Roughly, a justification practice, JP, accords α and β
formally equal discursive standing when JP accords α and β a justificatory say and
applies to each the same standards and constraints, such as the same authoritative-
ness constraints. But JP accords α and β substantively equal discursive standing only
if their discursive standing allows them to exercise the same level of discursive
influence in justification, or on its outcomes – that is, only if their discursive standing
has the same discursive purchase (Besch 2019a, p. 417f; 2019b, p. 606f; 2014, p.
216ff).
The following example helps to clarify the distinction at work here, and it sub-
stantiates that formal discursive equality is compatible with domination. Let JP1 be a
justification practice that adopts a negative variant of an equal acceptability require-
ment (Besch 2019a, p. 474f):
JP1 φ is valid if and only if no affected person can authoritatively reject (i.e., in JP1, all
affected people have a justificatory say vis-à-vis φ, and JP1 applies the same standards,
including its authoritativeness constraint, ψ, throughout).
JP1’s constituency includes Dominant Group and Marginal Group. Over time, Dominant
Group has used its social influence and “occlusion” power (Jenkins and Lukes 2017), to
define ψ in terms of values that it accepts and Marginal Group rejects: JP1 recognizes
discursive input as authoritative, or as positively or negatively contributing to justification,
only insofar as this input is compatible with the values of Dominant Group.
JP1 satisfies formal discursive equality: in JP1, it is true of each agent that φ can
count as justified or valid only if φ cannot authoritatively be rejected by that agent.
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But JP1 does not also instantiate substantive discursive equality; and the way in
which it fails to do this is problematic. Members of Marginal Group do not have
equal influence in justification, or on its outcomes; they do not have (substantively)
“equal opportunity for political influence” (Cohen 2006, p. 242), or (substantively)
equal opportunity “to participate in the process of public deliberation” (Peter 2009,
p. 67), or do not enjoy equal substantive inclusion (Dieleman 2015, p. 803). JP1
filters, brackets, or hypotheticalizes their voice or perspective in a way in which it
does not filter, bracket, or hypotheticalize the voice or perspective of members of
Dominant Group. And so JP1’s authoritativeness constraint can make it impossible
for members of Marginal Group to effectively contest or reject the values of
Dominant Group. Thus, JP1 entrenches the dominance of Dominant Group, and it
turns justification practice itself into a vehicle of domination, or forms of it, such as
“hermeneutic” domination (Catala 2015).
Consequently, in order to attain non-domination outcomes, it is not enough to
ensure that relevant constraints are justifiable in justification practices that accord
people a formally equal justificatory say. It must also be the case that their justifica-
tory say is not problematically or impermissibly unequal, or too low, in discursive
influence. This suggests that the kind of discursive equality that is called for here
is purchase-sensitive (Besch 2019a, p. 475f): if we assume that discursive equality
requires a formally equal justificatory say, we have reasons to assume, as well, that
discursive equality depends on the level of discursive influence that the having of
such a say allows each agent to exercise in justification, or on its outcomes, given
their actual voice and perspective. But what level of discursive influence is the right
level?
This is not the place to delve into this vexing question, or to engage competing
views on the matter (e.g., see Forst 2013, p. 165; Besch 2019b, pp. 618–621; Besch
2019a, pp. 476–485). Merely two things can be highlighted. First, there are reasons
to construe the kind of discursive equality that underpins Forst’s conception of non-
domination as purchase-sensitive. To attain non-domination outcomes, an equal
justificatory say must allow people to exercise a suitable level of discursive influence
in justification. How much or how little influence this calls for is an open question –
and one that appears to involve deeper matters of value. This is so if it is true that a
high level of discursive influence, or “high-purchase discursive standing,” is an
“inclusive enabler good,” or “a good that we value, or have reasons to value, and that
helps to protect and support the pursuit of a wide (but not unlimited) range of
conceptions of what is good, right, or true” (Besch 2019a, p. 427f). The matter at
hand, then, appears to raise questions about the permissibility, justness, or the
desirability of ways to allocate a potentially highly important discursive good.
Second, the matter at hand concerns the conditions under which a standard like
RGA can confer authority. Consider:
(i) In terms of what idea of the reasonable should we define the authoritativeness
constraints of reciprocal and general justification (e.g., for the purposes of a
justification of the constraints that practices of toleration impose on people)?
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That no relevant person can “reasonably” reject φ cannot justify φ if an objec-
tionable idea of the reasonable is in play. And an idea of the reasonable is objec-
tionable if it leaves people with too little discursive influence or entails
impermissible interpersonal differences in discursive influence. If so, then questions
like the following mark a theme that is constitutive for the authority, or normativity,
of reciprocal and general justification:
(ii) How much discursive influence in justification, or on its outcomes, should the
justificatory say of relevant people allow them to exercise (in their own right,
and vis-à-vis others)?
If we do not know how (ii) must be answered, then we do not know how we may
interpret, or calibrate, the normative content of standards like RGA. But if this is not
known, then we do not know whether the fact that salient constraints are justifiable
by such a standard can really justify them, constitute their authority, or secure non-
domination outcomes.
It is an open question how the participation value of standards like RGA must be
calibrated in order to ensure non-domination outcomes. And this question invites
much reasonable disagreement. More than one pro tanto reasonable view is available
about the conditions that justification standards must meet to permissibly allocate the
good of discursive influence across diverse constituencies (e.g., consider the views
sampled in Besch 2019a, pp. 476–485).
Thus, the theme of discursive equality marks a gateway to deeper questions of
value. It puts the participation value of justification at the center of a justification-
centric conception of non-domination toleration, and it asks us to (re)consider the
idea of non-domination toleration in this light. Even if a practice of toleration only
imposes constraints that are justifiable by reasons that all relevant people can equally
accept authoritatively, or cannot authoritatively reject, non-domination outcomes are
not guaranteed. For the question remains whether the authoritativeness constrains
that are in play suitably allocate discursive influence. And if this matter invites
reasonable disagreement, there will be reasonable disagreement at the heart of a duly
accountable conception of non-domination toleration.
Summary and Future Directions
This chapter focused on the idea of non-domination toleration, or its normative form,
through the lens of a discussion of Forst’s republican conception of non-domination
toleration. Non-domination toleration in Forst’s sense requires that practices of
toleration draw the limits of toleration in a manner that is suitably justifiable to
relevant people – that is, the legal, political, or other constraints that spring from its
view of these limits must be justifiable to all affected people on the basis of reasons
that are equally acceptable by them. After reconstructing this conception, this
chapter interrogated the idea of reasonableness that comes with the idea of reciprocal
and general justification on which Forst premises non-domination toleration. And it
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addressed the idea of equal respect, or one key implication of it, that reciprocal and
general justification builds on and that is at the heart of the republican understanding
of non-domination that underpins Forst’s view of non-domination toleration.
The chapter pointed toward two issues. First, even if non-domination toleration is
possible only where people are suitably respected as equals and salient constraints
are equally justifiable to them, the kind of justification called for here arguably
should not be understood in terms of Forst-type reciprocal and general justifiability:
for it is not clear what it means for (putatively) justifying reasons to be “reciprocally
and generally” acceptable, or to be “reasonably” non-rejectable.
Second, given the purposes of non-domination toleration, equal (discursive)
respect calls for a form of discursive equality that is not just formal, but purchase
sensitive. If practices of toleration must only impose constraints that are justifiable
by reasons that people can equally accept authoritatively, then non-domination
outcomes are not ensured if the authoritativeness constrains that are in play do not
allocate discursive influence permissibly, or justly.
But what allocation of this potentially highly important discursive good does non-
domination toleration call for? On this, the jury is still out.
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